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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Vestal Dean Caudill entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and the district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, 
with one year fixed, but suspended that sentence and placed Mr. Caudill on probation. 
As part of his plea agreement, he specifically preserved his right to appeal the district 
court's denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, Mr. Caudill asserts that the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Mr. Caudill asserts that his 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 § 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution, was violated because he was illegally detained when a deputy 
seized his identification without a reasonable basis to do so. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Just after midnight on April 21, 2012, Deputy Tony Bernad of the Cassia County 
Sherriff's Office observed the headlights of Vestal Dean Caudill's vehicle driving on a 
gravel road in a rural area. (8/6/12 Tr., p.6, Ls.15-18, p.7, Ls.8-22; R., pp.69-70. 1) 
While Deputy Bernad watched, Mr. Caudill stopped his vehicle and turned off the 
headlights. (8/6/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.5-8.) Deputy Bernad pulled up in front of Mr. Caudill's 
vehicle in the middle of the gravel road, and activated his rear flashing amber lights, but 
did not activate his overhead blue and red lights. (8/6/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-14; R., p.69.) 
1 For purposes of the hearing on Mr. Caudill's motion to suppress, Mr. Caudill's counsel 
stipulated to the facts as set forth by the State in its brief in opposition to the Motion to 
Suppress. (R., p.63.) 
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The deputy made contact with Mr. Caudill and asked him how he was doing and where 
he lived. (8/6/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-24; R., pp.69-70.) Deputy Bernad testified that he 
made contact with the driver of the vehicle because the mountainous area where he 
saw the vehicle was a party spot for kids and there were a few thefts of metal reported 
in that area. (8/6/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-4; R., p.69.) After briefly speaking to Mr. Caudill, 
Deputy Bernad asked Mr. Caudill for his identification. (8/6/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-6; 
R., p.70.) Mr. Caudill handed the deputy his driver's license. (8/6/12 Tr., p.18, L.25 -
p.12, L.1.) When he checked the status of Mr. Caudill's driver's license, Deputy Bernad 
found that Mr. Caudill had a warrant for his arrest. (8/6/12 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-8.) In a 
search incident to the arrest of Mr. Caudill, Deputy Bernad located a pipe in 
Mr. Caudill's pocket which, upon testing, was found to contain methamphetamine 
residue. (8/6/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.14-22; R., p.70.) 
The State filed a Complaint alleging that Mr. Caudill had committed the crime of 
felony possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and misdemeanor 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.19-20, 28-29.) Mr. Caudill waived his right to 
a preliminary hearing and was bound over into the district court, and an Information was 
filed charging him with the above crimes. (R., pp.33-34, 36.) 
Mr. Caudill moved to suppress the evidence obtained. (Motion to Suppress, 
attached to Motion to Augment filed on September 25, 2013.) A hearing was held on 
Mr. Caudill's Motion to Suppress, during which Deputy Bernad testified regarding his 
encounter with Mr. Caudill. (See generally, 8/9/12 Tr.) At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the district court issued a briefing deadline for both parties. (8/6/12 Tr., p.19, L.17 -
p.20, L.11.) Through his briefing, Mr. Caudill argued that Deputy Bernad unlawfully 
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seized him when he asked for his driver's license, and that all of the evidence gathered 
against him should be suppressed as fruit of his unlawful seizure. (R., pp.63-67.) The 
district court later issued a written decision denying Mr. Caudill's Motion to Suppress. 
(R., pp.75-79.) 
law: 
The district court entered the following written findings of fact and conclusions of 
1. Shortly after midnight on April 21, 2012, Deputy Antonio Bernad of the 
Cassia County Sheriff's Office observed the headlights of a pickup driving 
on 1050 East, a one-lane rural road, towards 200 South near Declo in 
Cassia County, Idaho. As the pickup neared 200 South, it stopped and its 
headlights turned off. Deputy Bernad drove to its location, parked on the 
road facing the pickup, and activated the amber light and rear flashers on 
his marked patrol vehicle. 
2. Officer Bernad approached the passenger side window of the pickup 
and made contact with the driver, Vestal Dean Caudill. Deputy Bernad 
had a brief conversation with Mr. Caudill. Deputy Bernad asked 
Mr. Caudill how he was doing and if he was okay. He also asked 
Mr. Caudill for his name and identification. While he was waiting for 
Mr. Caudill to get out his driver's license, Deputy Bernad asked 
Mr. Caudill! what was going on that night and if he had seen any children 
in the area. 
3. After Mr. Caudill handed Deputy Bernad his driver's license, Deputy 
Bernad returned to his patrol vehicle and ran a warrant check through 
dispatch. He discovered that Mr. Caudill had an active arrest warrant out 
of Ada County. Deputy Bernard returned to the pickup and placed 
Mr. Caudill under arrest. In a search incident to the arrest, Deputy Bernad 
found a methamphetamine pipe on Mr. Caudill's person. 
4. Mr. Caudill contended that Deputy Bernad lacked reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause to detain and search him. Specifically, Mr. Caudill 
contended that he was unlawfully seized pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment when Deputy Bernad took and retained his driver's license. 
5. The district court found that during a consensual encounter, a police 
officer may ask to examine an individual's identification. State v. Liechty, 
152 Idaho 163 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Idaho Code Section 49-316 requires an 
individual to surrender his or her driver's license to a peace officer upon 
demand. The district court found that while a limited detention occurs 
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when an officer retains an individual's identification, in State v. Godwin, 
121 Idaho 491, 495 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court held that "a police 
officer's brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver's 
license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable 
for purposes of the fourth amendment." 
6. The district court found that when Deputy Bernad approached 
Mr. Caudill, it was a consensual encounter. Deputy Bernad did not 
restrain Mr. Caudill by physical force or by a show of authority. He did not 
physically confine Mr. Caudill or block an exit route for Mr. Caudill's 
vehicle. He asked brief, permissible questions, and his manner was non-
threatening and friendly. Deputy Bernad was permitted to ask Mr. Caudill 
for his identification. Deputy Bernad's conduct during the encounter would 
not have suggested to a reasonable person that compliance with his 
requests was required or that Mr. Caudill was not at liberty to go about his 
business. 
7. The district court found that when Deputy Bernad took Mr. Caudill's 
driver's license and returned to his patrol car to run a check for warrants, 
Mr. Caudill was not free to leave and the consensual encounter had 
become a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; however, the limited 
detention was reasonable because it was brief and because it occurred 
after the deputy's lawful contact with Mr. Caudill. 
(R., pp.76-79.) The district court denied Mr. Caudill's motion to suppress.2 (R., p.79.) 
Mr. Caudill entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled 
substance, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.3 
(R., pp.139-140, 151-153.) The misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia charge 
was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. (R., p.171.) Mr. Caudill was sentenced 
to a unified term of three years, with one year fixed, but the district court suspended his 
sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.159-162.) Mr. Caudill filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.173-175.) 
2 In its written Order, the district court concluded in a footnote that the discovery of a 
valid arrest warrant is a recognized intervening event under the doctrine of attenuation 
that may dissipate the taint of an initially unlawful detention. (R., p.79, n.1.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Caudill's motion to suppress? 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Caudill's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mindful of State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986 (Ct. App. 2004), in which the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that after the officer initially made lawful contact with the 
defendant, the officer's subsequent brief detention of the defendant to run a status 
check on his driver's license was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Caudill 
asserts that the district court erred in concluding that his detention was reasonable, and 
further asserts that he was subjected to an illegal detention, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
8. Standard Of Review 
This Court applies a bifurcated standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to suppress. The reviewing court gives deference to the district court's findings 
of fact, and will not disturb these findings if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). However, 
this Court reviews de novo the district court's conclusions of law regarding whether 
constitutional requirements have been met in light of the facts found. Id. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Caudill's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482, 486 (2009). The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been 
incorporated to apply to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. Its purpose is to impose a standard of 
reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents to safeguard 
an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions. State v. Maddox, 137 
Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 
(1979)). However, not every police-citizen encounter triggers Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny. An encounter between the police and an individual does not trigger scrutiny 
under the Fourth Amendment unless the encounter is non-consensual. State v. Nickel, 
134 Idaho 610, 612 (2000) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). A 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs only '"when the officer, by means of 
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a 
citizen."' Id. at612-13 (quoting Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). 
An individual is not detained, and therefore the Fourth Amendment is generally 
not implicated, where the encounter with police is consensual. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 
122 Idaho 100, 102 (Ct. App. 1991). Even where there is no reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, an officer generally may ask an individual questions and request his or 
her identification. Id. The critical inquiry for determining whether a police encounter 
with an individual is consensual, or rather constitutes a detention, is whether the totality 
of the circumstances shows that the police conduct - either words, actions, or both -
would have conveyed to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to ignore the 
police presence and leave. Id. at 103. When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence 
that was allegedly obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, the burden is on the 
defendant to prove that a seizure occurred. Id. at 654. 
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Finally, if evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal seizure normally 
must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 485 (1963). To determine whether to suppress evidence as "fruit of the 
poisonous tree," the court must inquire whether the evidence has been recovered as a 
result of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable 
to be purged of the primary taint. United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 520 (7th 
Cir.1997). 
Mindful of the decision by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Landreth, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court decision in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004) (holding 
that an encounter with a pedestrian became an improper detention when the officer 
asked for identification and took the defendant's driver's license, but that discovery of an 
outstanding warrant constituted an intervening event which dissipated the taint from the 
unlawful detention), Mr. Caudill asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress. Mr. Caudill asserts that he was unlawfully seized when the deputy took his 
driver's license, that the seizure was unreasonable, and that the discovery of the 
outstanding warrant for his arrest did not constitute an intervening circumstance. 
Accordingly, he asserts that all evidence discovered following the illegal seizure of his 
driver's license and person must be suppressed. 
Here, Mr. Caudill was driving on a rural dirt road with his headlights on. (8/6/12 
Tr., p. 7, Ls.15-25.) He stopped and turned his headlights off. (8/6/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.5-8.) 
Deputy Bernad testified that the reason he made contact with the vehicle was "[t]o find 
out what was going on." (8/6/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-14.) After obtaining Mr. Caudill's 
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driver's license and checking the status of the license, Deputy Bernad was advised of a 
valid arrest warrant for Mr. Caudill. (8/6/12 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-8.) However, Mr. Caudill 
asserts that because his contact with the deputy became an illegal detention when 
Deputy Bernad seized his driver's license, all evidence and statements discovered 
during the search incident to his arrest should be suppressed. 
Mindful of the holdings in Landreth and Page, Mr. Caudill asserts that he was 
unlawfully seized when the deputy took his driver's license, that the detention was 
unreasonable, and that the discovery of the outstanding warrant for his arrest did not 
constitute an intervening circumstance sufficient to dissipate the taint of the unlawful 
search. Accordingly, he asserts that all evidence discovered following the illegal seizure 
of his driver's license and person must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Caudill respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
judgment of conviction and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2013. 
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